Return to field — TKR106
KHIF · 142026-08-25 19:08 UTC· KHIF → KHIF· CORSAIR TWO LLC· MD87
TKR106 (Corsair TWO) had departed KHIF on 2026-08-25. SkyMeter detected a return to field at Hill Air Force Base (KHIF) on runway 14 at 19:08 UTC. Peak altitude 11,983 ft, turnaround area near Tooele, US. Approach stability score: 36/100. Scores below 50 occur on under 10% of approaches at this runway and indicate the v2 scorer flagged the approach as highly anomalous (three or more gates exceeded the runway's P90 envelope simultaneously). METAR at the time reported 0 kt wind, 16,093 m visibility. Detection algorithm and known limitations: see SkyMeter methodology.
Active FAA TFR during this flight
Source: FAA TFR archive (hourly snapshot)- HAZARDS6/7347 2026-08-24 13:00Z – 2026-09-07 04:00Z SFC–10,000 ft
35NM SW PROVO, UT, Monday, August 24, 2026 through Monday, September 7, 2026 UTC
View FAA NOTAM → - HAZARDS6/7530 2026-08-24 17:00Z – 2026-09-06 03:00Z SFC–10,000 ft
35NM SW PROVO, UT, Monday, August 24, 2026 through Sunday, September 6, 2026 UTC
View FAA NOTAM → - HAZARDS6/7654 2026-08-25 13:00Z – 2026-09-07 04:00Z SFC–10,000 ft
35NM SW PROVO, UT, Tuesday, August 25, 2026 through Monday, September 7, 2026 UTC
View FAA NOTAM →
SkyMeter cross-referenced this flight against FAA-published TFRs that were active during its window and within its geographic bounding box. Overlap doesn't necessarily mean violation — the aircraft may have been outside the TFR’s precise polygon or flying under air-traffic-control coordination.
Pilot review data
- Runway 14
- 11983 ft AGL at event
- 358 kt ground speed
- 0 fpm vertical
- Approach stability 36/100
- 0 kt wind
- 0 kt crosswind component
- 16,093 m visibility
- KHIF 160455Z 11004KT 10SM BKN190 20/02 A2995 RMK AO2A SLP095 T02040022
Flight context
- TKR106
- Corsair TWO
- MD87
- KHIF → KHIF
- 2026-08-25 19:08 UTC
- KHIF runway 14
All events on this flight
Automated analysis. Events shown on this page (such as go-around, unstable approach, or runway events) are heuristic classifications produced by algorithms from publicly broadcast ADS-B data. They are intended to surface flights of interest for further review — they are not findings of fact, and they do not determine pilot fault, regulatory compliance, or the cause of any occurrence. Coverage gaps and sensor noise can affect accuracy. Only the relevant civil aviation authority or accident investigation body can make official determinations. How we detect events · Dispute or correct this data