Unstable approach — EJM657

EJM657 (G650 Operating) was operating from K5B2 to KCLL on 2026-08-26. SkyMeter detected a low approach-stability score at Easterwood Field (KCLL) on runway 17 at 02:36 UTC. Trace data at the event: 1409 ft AGL, 120 kt GS. METAR at the time reported 7 kt wind, 16,093 m visibility. The approach-stability score rates the final approach against stabilized-approach gates (glideslope, lateral deviation, descent rate, and IAS) at defined altitudes. A low score means one or more of those were outside the normal envelope for how the approach was flown. The score is graded by guidance type, so instrument approaches (ILS or an aligned straight-in) are held to the full gate set, while visual and pattern arrivals are surfaced only when the score is clearly low. The score is advisory and observational, a deviation measure, not an assertion of an accident. Detection algorithm and known limitations: see SkyMeter methodology.

• SECURITY5/2811 2025-10-20 12:00Z – 2026-10-20 12:00Z SFC–1,000 ft

  NEW YORK, NY, Monday, October 20, 2025 through Tuesday, October 20, 2026 Local

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• SECURITY6/0708 2026-08-01 00:01Z – 2027-08-01 23:59Z SFC–400 ft

  Goodlettsville, TN, Saturday, August 1, 2026 through Sunday, August 1, 2027 UTC

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• SECURITY6/5076 2026-08-19 15:00Z – 2026-08-30 22:00Z SFC–1,000 ft

  Williamsport, PA, Wednesday, August 19, 2026 through Sunday, August 30, 2026 Local

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• SECURITY6/5424 2026-08-21 22:00Z – 2026-08-27 03:59Z SFC–400 ft

  East Rutherford, NJ, Friday, August 21, 2026 through Wednesday, August 26, 2026 Local

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SkyMeter cross-referenced this flight against FAA-published TFRs that were active during its window and within its geographic bounding box. Overlap doesn't necessarily mean violation — the aircraft may have been outside the TFR’s precise polygon or flying under air-traffic-control coordination.

Automated analysis. Events shown on this page (such as go-around, unstable approach, or runway events) are heuristic classifications produced by algorithms from publicly broadcast ADS-B data. They are intended to surface flights of interest for further review — they are not findings of fact, and they do not determine pilot fault, regulatory compliance, or the cause of any occurrence. Coverage gaps and sensor noise can affect accuracy. Only the relevant civil aviation authority or accident investigation body can make official determinations. How we detect events · Dispute or correct this data