Diversion — EJA553
KPWM · 182026-08-19 22:42 UTC· K09J → KPWM· AIVIA LLC, ALBATON AIR LLC, STEWART-PRITCHETT ANDREA, CONCRETE P· C68A
EJA553 (Aivia) was operating from K09J to KMSP (Minneapolis-St Paul International/Wold-Chamberlain Airport) on 2026-08-19. SkyMeter detected a diversion to Portland International Jetport (KPWM) on runway 18 at 22:42 UTC. Peak cruise altitude FL435, turnaround area near Washington County, US. METAR at the time reported 8 kt wind, 5 kt crosswind component, 16,093 m visibility. Detection algorithm and known limitations: see SkyMeter methodology.
Active FAA TFR during this flight
Source: FAA TFR archive (hourly snapshot)- SECURITY5/2811 2025-10-20 12:00Z – 2026-10-20 12:00Z SFC–1,000 ft
NEW YORK, NY, Monday, October 20, 2025 through Tuesday, October 20, 2026 Local
View FAA NOTAM → - SECURITY6/5452 2026-08-17 12:30Z – 2026-08-22 06:00Z SFC–2,500 ft
MAYPORT, FL, Monday, August 17, 2026 through Saturday, August 22, 2026 Local
View FAA NOTAM → - SECURITY6/5076 2026-08-19 15:00Z – 2026-08-30 22:00Z SFC–1,000 ft
Williamsport, PA, Wednesday, August 19, 2026 through Sunday, August 30, 2026 Local
View FAA NOTAM → - VIP6/5429 2026-08-19 20:00Z – 2026-08-20 13:00Z SFC–4,999 ft
SOUTHAMPTON, NY, Wednesday, August 19, 2026 through Thursday, August 20, 2026 Local
View FAA NOTAM →
SkyMeter cross-referenced this flight against FAA-published TFRs that were active during its window and within its geographic bounding box. Overlap doesn't necessarily mean violation — the aircraft may have been outside the TFR’s precise polygon or flying under air-traffic-control coordination.
Pilot review data
- Runway 18
- 47 ft AGL at event
- 120 kt ground speed
- 0 fpm vertical
- 8 kt wind
- 5 kt crosswind component
- 16,093 m visibility
- KPWM 170051Z 00000KT 10SM CLR 17/15 A3029 RMK AO2 SLP255 T01720150 $
Flight context
- EJA553
- Aivia
- C68A
- K09J → KPWM
- 2026-08-19 22:42 UTC
- KPWM runway 18
Automated analysis. Events shown on this page (such as go-around, unstable approach, or runway events) are heuristic classifications produced by algorithms from publicly broadcast ADS-B data. They are intended to surface flights of interest for further review — they are not findings of fact, and they do not determine pilot fault, regulatory compliance, or the cause of any occurrence. Coverage gaps and sensor noise can affect accuracy. Only the relevant civil aviation authority or accident investigation body can make official determinations. How we detect events · Dispute or correct this data