Long landing rollout — GXA6232

KT05 · 12

2026-08-28 01:50 UTC· UMB BANK NA TRUSTEE· A319

GXA6232 (UMB Bank NA) was inbound to KT05 on 2026-08-28. SkyMeter detected a long landing rollout at Charles R Johnson Airport (KT05) on runway 12 at 01:50 UTC. Trace data at the event: 39 ft AGL, 6 kt GS, 0 fpm vertical. METAR at the time reported 10 kt wind, 4 kt crosswind component. A long landing rollout is detected when ground deceleration after touchdown is below the per-runway P10 envelope. It is an observational measure of rollout efficiency, not a runway-exit incident. Detection algorithm and known limitations: see SkyMeter methodology.

Active FAA TFR during this flight

Source: FAA TFR archive (hourly snapshot)
  • SECURITY5/6914 2025-05-06 23:30Z – 2027-10-18 11:03Z SFC–6,000 ft

    South Padre Island, TX, Tuesday, May 6, 2025 Local

    View FAA NOTAM →
  • SECURITY5/3678 2026-01-01 05:00Z – 2027-01-01 05:59Z SFC–2,000 ft

    Brownsville, TX, Thursday, January 1, 2026 through Friday, January 1, 2027 Local

    View FAA NOTAM →
  • SECURITY5/3679 2026-01-01 05:00Z – 2027-01-01 05:59Z SFC–5,000 ft

    Brownsville, TX, Thursday, January 1, 2026 through Friday, January 1, 2027 Local

    View FAA NOTAM →
  • HAZARDS6/7111 2026-08-24 05:00Z – 2026-09-05 05:00Z SFC–10,000 ft

    BROWNSVILLE, TX, Monday, August 24, 2026 through Saturday, September 5, 2026 UTC

    View FAA NOTAM →

SkyMeter cross-referenced this flight against FAA-published TFRs that were active during its window and within its geographic bounding box. Overlap doesn't necessarily mean violation — the aircraft may have been outside the TFR’s precise polygon or flying under air-traffic-control coordination.

Pilot review data

  • Runway 12
  • 39 ft AGL at event
  • 6 kt ground speed
  • 0 fpm vertical
  • 10 kt wind
  • 4 kt crosswind component

Flight context

  • GXA6232
  • UMB Bank NA
  • A319
  • 2026-08-28 01:50 UTC
  • KT05 runway 12

Automated analysis. Events shown on this page (such as go-around, unstable approach, or runway events) are heuristic classifications produced by algorithms from publicly broadcast ADS-B data. They are intended to surface flights of interest for further review — they are not findings of fact, and they do not determine pilot fault, regulatory compliance, or the cause of any occurrence. Coverage gaps and sensor noise can affect accuracy. Only the relevant civil aviation authority or accident investigation body can make official determinations. How we detect events · Dispute or correct this data

SkyMeter · trace data observed via ADS-B· KT05